In this paper, we study the implications for macroeconomic and …nancial stability of macroprudential policies in a monetary union. With this purpose, we develop a two-country monetary union new Keynesian general equilibrium model with housing and collateral constraints, to be calibrated for Lithuania and the rest of the euro area. We consider two di¤erent scenarios for macroprudential policies: one in which the ECB extends its goals to also include …nancial stability and a second one in which a national macroprudential authority uses the loan-to-value ratio (LTV) as an instrument.
Introduction
Lithuania, as a new member of the euro area, has to implement its macroprudential policies in the context of this new economic setting, by interacting with the other monetary union members, that indeed share the same monetary policy. The Bank of Lithuania pursues macroprudential policy at the national level and monitors, assesses, and acts to limit the macroprudential risk for the stability of the domestic …nancial system; in doing so, it has the possibility to cooperate with the ECB and other national and international institutions.
Macroprudential implementation is particularly relevant in the context of monetary unions, especially if they are non-optimal monetary areas like the euro area. There is good evidence that both business and …nancial cycles are not perfectly synchronized among members and that there are important cross-country structural di¤erences. 1 For instance, there are some particularities in the Lithuanian housing markets that make it di¤erent from its euro area partners. One of these di¤erences regards mortgage contracts. Housing loans (and loans to non-…nancial corporations, NFCs) in Lithuania are almost exclusively made at variable interest rates (which are set for …xed periods, e.g. of up to 1 year), which are quick to respond to changes in borrowing costs in the …nancial markets. 2 In the beginning of 2013, about 70 per cent of new loans to households were issued at ‡exible interest rates. In 2014 and 2015, the proportion increased to more than 80 per cent (in 2015 the share of ‡exible rate loans, for both 1 See for instance Comunale and Hessel (2014) , for an analysis of …nancial and business cycles in the euro area. See Comunale (2017) , for a study on synchronicity of cycles within countries and structural aspects of mortgage markets and housing in the EU. For an analysis of the cross-country synchronization, see Mink et al. (2012) and Samarina et al. (2015) . 2 See Karmaziene and Varanauskiene (2014) .
households and NFCs, reached 90 per cent). 3 In the big countries of the euro area, however, the majority of households take mortgages at a …xed rate. 4 For France and Germany, the ratio of ‡exible-rate loans is pretty low, around 12 per cent and 15 per cent respectively, while in Spain it reaches 82 per cent. This high heterogeneity is re ‡ected in an average percentage of variable-rate mortgages in the old members of the euro area of 45 per cent (the correspective percentage of …xed-rate loans is therefore 55 per cent).
The percentage of ‡exible rate loans is even lower if we take into account euro area with 19 members.
Also, the amount of consolidated debt (over GDP) of both households and NFCs is quite heterogeneous across the euro area. Lithuanians experienced low values in both cases, even if debt levels increased rapidly in the period 2006-2009, especially for NFCs (83% of GDP at the peak on an average of 64% in the last decade and 55% in 2015). In Table A .1 in the Appendix, we show these di¤erences in housing and mortgage markets across the euro area member states.
In this context, the single monetary policy cannot be used to stabilize the economy of a particular member when it is shocked by an asymmetric disturbance or when the reaction to a common disturbance is di¤erent due to the structural characteristics of that member state. Therefore, di¤erent countries may have limited scope to in ‡uence their domestic macroeconomic conditions. The behavior of …nancial cycles and related build-ups of systemic risks often remain local in nature, even if spillovers and global factors may occur. Thus, macroprudential policy is especially important in a currency union such as the euro area, given the absence of country-speci…c monetary policy. In this setting, there would be a role for the macroprudential policy to complement monetary policy, especially if it is conducted at a national level. Most of macroprudential tools can have an impact on in ‡ation and activity. Thus, it could happen that macroprudential policies reinforce the monetary policy decisions, but also that they counteract each other. Therefore, it is crucial to assess the e¤ects of policies across member states.
It is clear now that preventing and mitigating systemic risks to …nancial stability has become an explicit policy objective. However, the stance of macroprudential policy must re ‡ect …nancial cycles and structures, which, as already stated, can di¤er markedly across member states. The objectives of monetary and macroprudential policy are distinct, but may complement each other. The objective of monetary policy is typically price stability although it may be extended to include …nancial stability,
given that price stability cannot be maintained in an unstable …nancial system. Equally, …nancial stability, the objective of macroprudential policy, cannot be maintained when in ‡ation is out of control.
Therefore, monetary policy can reinforce …nancial stability but it can also have undesirable side e¤ects on …nancial stability. For example, low policy rates, consistent with the pursuit of price stability, may lead to asset price bubbles that could pose risks to …nancial stability. Macroprudential policy can address such risks with instruments that are more targeted than monetary policy instruments. Ultimately, it is necessary to …nd a policy mix that addresses …nancial stability without compromising monetary policy objectives.
In the European Union (EU), the European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) is the main body responsible for monitoring macroprudential policies, although each country can implement its own policy.
That is, macroprudential policies are implemented at a national level, but within a system of central supervision. However, the ECB could also include among its objectives to safeguard …nancial stability.
In this policy framework, it is important to …nd the right toolkit of national macroeconomic policies in a monetary union that, necessarily, applies the same monetary policy among all its members. Thus, it is necessary to stabilize the …nancial cycle and to avoid …nancial divergences to arise in the euro area, without compromising real business cycle convergence. Therefore, country speci…c macroprudential policies will have an important role to play in the euro area in cooperation with ECB policy.
In this paper, we study these issues taking as an example the case in Lithuania. Now that Lithuania is part of the euro area, the question is how to correctly implement policies to promote …nancial stability, in accordance with the other members. The economy of Lithuania has su¤ered from the same …nancial stability problems stemming from the crisis as some other countries of the euro area. And it has in fact fully recovered in terms of economic activity. One of the intermediate objectives that the Bank of Lithuania has set is to mitigate excessive credit growth and too high leverage.
We aim at illustrating how macroprudential policies could be implemented in Lithuania and in the rest of the euro area. We propose the implementation of a macroprudential tool, based on the loan-to-value ratio (LTV) 5 , that acts countercyclically. 6 We compare the e¤ects of this rule with an extended Taylor rule in which the ECB extends its objectives to also take care of …nancial stability. The basic modelling setup constitutes a two-country new Keynesian DSGE model with …nancial frictions. In each country, 5 In our model, the LTV ratio will be calibrated to match the average (market) LTV in steady state. However the market LTV can vary depending on economic conditions and it may be di¤erent with respect to the imposed LTV cap set by authority. When the LTV cap is high, the collateral constraint is less tight. And, since the constraint in this model is binding, borrowers will borrow as much as they are allowed to. Lowering the LTV tightens the constraint and therefore restricts the loans that borrowers can obtain. 6 Here we follow Angelini et al. (2014) in which they assume that the loss function in the economy also contains …nancial variables. Therefore, we use it as a proxy for …nancial stability, which is seen as the actual aim of macroprudential policy (Galati and Moessner, 2011). there is a group of individuals that are credit constrained and need housing collateral to obtain loans.
Countries trade goods, and savers in each country have access to foreign assets. Within this setting, we study the macroeconomic and …nancial stability e¤ects of macroprudential policies in Lithuania, in the context of the euro area. As a macroprudential tool, we propose a decentralized rule for the LTV which responds to national deviations in credit from its steady state. We also include the common monetary policy with a Taylor rule, consistent with the ECB target of price stability, with interest-rate smoothing for interest-rate setting by a single central bank. We then extend the Taylor rule to also respond to union credit deviations from its steady state.
Results show that in Lithuania, shocks are transmitted in a stronger way given variable rates in this country, higher mortgage debt and LTVs. However, macroprudential policies are successful at mitigating the e¤ects on shocks on credit growth. We also …nd that both rules are e¤ective in terms of reducing the volatility of borrowing and therefore in bringing a more stable …nancial system, the goal of macroprudential policies. However, the macroprudential Taylor rule seems to be more e¤ective for this purpose in both countries. Nevertheless, even though this rule is very e¤ective in reducing the volatility of credit, it comes with a cost in terms of in ‡ation volatility. When using the interest rate as the only instrument both for monetary and macroprudential policy, there is a trade-o¤ between stabilizing the …nancial system and keeping prices stable, which should be the primary goal of monetary policy. The 
Literature Review and our Contribution
This paper constitutes a two-country version of the seminal paper of Iacoviello (2005) , which introduces a …nancial accelerator that works through the housing sector, in the ‡avor of Aspachs and Rabanal (2010) .
However, it introduces cross-country housing-market heterogeneity as in Rubio (2014) or Rubio and Comunale (2017) . This paper is also related to the recent literature on macroprudential and monetary policies in Iacoviello-type models such in the aforementioned Kannan, Rabanal and Scott (2012) or Carrasco-Gallego (2013, 2014) . However, it explores the issue in a two-country setting as in Brzoza-Brzezina et al. (2015) .
Our paper contributes to this literature by looking at a two-country DSGE, modelled for Lithuania and the euro area, in which we analyze whether the monetary policy rule should respond to …nancial instability as well, or there should be instead a separate rule to deal with the latter one. To answer our research question, we provide a regular Taylor rule, as the pre-crisis policy setting, an extended Taylor rule in which the central bank takes care of both macroeconomic stability and …nancial stability (de…ned as the standard deviation of credit), and a case in which we have both a regular Taylor rule and a rule for macroprudential actions, based on LTV ratios reacting to borrowing. We believe this issue is crucial, especially in the context of the euro area and its member states, here represented by Lithuania as a small open economy with speci…c characteristics of the housing market, which makes it a very interesting case study. Having a centralized monetary policy, makes the macroprudential policy a way to act independently as a partial substitute for the lack of national monetary policies. 7 However, our study makes the two policies working in a context of a monetary union with transmissions and relative obligations, looking at both the whole euro area and Lithuanian perspectives.
Our paper also relates to the literature on the interaction between monetary policy and macroprudential policy. This has been recently covered by Carrillo et al. (2016) , in the context of a so-called "Tinbergen principle," by looking at whether the monetary policy rule should be expanded to introduce …nancial stability considerations, or there should be instead a separate …nancial policy rule. Indeed, their main point is if having two policy targets (price and …nancial stability) would indeed require two instruments or we can actually apply a one-rule regime with a monetary policy rule, based on both in ‡ation and …nancial conditions (expected credit spreads, in their case). 8 The authors'…ndings favor separate but well-coordinated monetary and …nancial policies. Moreover, the dual regime is signi…cantly superior in terms of welfare gains.
Several other papers address the issue of whether central banks should react to …nancial stability conditions, or a separate …nancial authority at the national level is preferred. And the conclusions in the literature are rather di¤erent. They go from simply concluding that monetary policy authorities should react to …nancial stability issues when macroprudential policies fail as an instrument of last resort 9 , while still keeping the authorities separated (Smets, 2014) 10 , to proposing a modi…ed Taylor rule to include, for instance, a natural rate of interest (Taylor and Wieland, 2016) 11 , or an explicit …nancial variable (as house prices in Rubio and Carrasco-Gallego, 2015). Svensson (2015) and Yellen (2014) instead, are in favor of having a fully separated di¤erent authorities for the two objectives: one to address …nancial and macroprudential issues and a central bank focusing on price stability. Especially, Svensson (2015) , points out that macroprudential policy cannot achieve price stability and monetary policy, from its side, is not able to guarantee …nancial stability, not ensuring that there are su¢ cient capital and liquidity bu¤ers in the …nancial system. The author also stresses that the two policies indeed interact and only indirectly, for instance, monetary policy may in ‡uence …nancial stability via e¤ects on lending and credit; or macroprudential policy can have an impact on in ‡ation. Rubio and Carrasco-Gallego (2015) also consider this topic however, they do it in a closed economy setting. They conclude that welfare gains are maximized when the central bank aims at stabilizing in ‡ation, responding only to prices and output, and the macroprudential regulator cares about …nancial stability. Lastly, Quint and Rabanal (2014), also study the optimal mix of monetary and macroprudential policies in an estimated two-country model of the euro area, 12 representing core and periphery. 13 They conclude that extending a monetary policy rule to react to credit aggregates improves welfare with respect to the original one, with borrowers being worse o¤ under some conditions. Introducing a macroprudential instrument, further increases welfare but still with a trade-o¤ between borrowers and savers.
Model Setup
We consider an in…nite-horizon, two-country economy inside a monetary union. The home country is denoted by LIT and the rest of the union by EUR. Households consume, work, and demand real estate.
There is a …nancial intermediary in each country that provides mortgages and accepts deposits from 9 Smets (2014) suggests to allow the central bank to "lean against the wind" in case of …nancial stability troubles only if necessary, while maintaining its primary focus on price stability in the medium term.
1 0 Smets (2014) also stresses the possible risks of having macroprudential actions delivered by a central bank. First, there is a risk that the reputation of the central bank is damaged, which may a¤ect its overall independence and credibility. Second, it may give rise to time inconsistency problems and may lead to so-called "…nancial dominance." 1 1 As recently stressed by Pedersen (2015) , having a low natural real rate may drive an increase in risk taking and thus in the likelihood of asset price bubbles. This can have implications for …nancial stability. 1 2 This paper seems to be the closest to our approach, by also applying the framework by Rubio (2013) , and adding borrowing constraint á la Iacoviello (2005) with no default. The authors however estimate and not calibrate the model. 1 3 In Quint and Rabanal (2014), the two regions of the euro area, i.e.core and periphery, are obtained by aggregating data for France and Germany for the …rst group and Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, and Spain for the periphery.
consumers. 14 Each country produces one di¤erentiated intermediate good, but households consume goods from both countries. For simplicity, housing is a non-traded good. We assume that labor is immobile across the countries. 15 Firms follow a standard Calvo problem (after Calvo, 1983) . In this economy, both …nal and intermediate goods are produced. Prices are sticky in the intermediate-goods
sector. Monetary policy is conducted by a single central bank that responds to a weighted average of in ‡ation in both countries. Analogous to the setting of the interest rate, there is a rule for the setting of the LTV, which serves as a macroprudential measure. We allow for housing-market heterogeneity across the countries.
The Consumer' s Problem
There are three types of consumers in each country: unconstrained consumers, constrained consumers who borrow at a variable rate, and constrained consumers who borrow at a …xed rate. The proportion of each type of borrower is …xed and exogenous. 16 Consumers can be constrained or unconstrained in the sense that constrained individuals need to collateralize their debt repayments in order to borrow from the …nancial intermediary. Interest payments in the next period cannot exceed a proportion of the future value of the current house stock. In this way, the …nancial intermediary ensures that borrowers are going to be able to ful…ll their debt obligations in the next period. As in Iacoviello (2005) , We assume that constrained consumers are more impatient than unconstrained ones. 17 There is a …nancial intermediary in each country. The …nancial intermediary in each country accepts deposits from domestic savers, and it extends both …xed-and variable-rate loans to domestic borrowers.
Unconstrained Consumers (Savers)
Unconstrained consumers in LIT maximize as follows:
Here, E 0 is the expectation operator, 2 (0; 1) is the discount factor for savers, and C u t , H u t , and L u t are consumption at t, the stock of housing, and hours worked, respectively. j represents the weight of housing in the utility function. 1= ( 1) is the aggregate labor-supply elasticity.
Consumption is a bundle of domestically and foreign-produced goods, de…ned as:
where n is the size of LIT.
The budget constraint for LIT is as follows:
where LIT t denotes in ‡ation for the goods produced in LIT, de…ned as P LIT t =P LIT t 1 :
Maximizing (1) subject to (3) ; we obtain the …rst-order conditions for the unconstrained group:
Equation (4) equates the marginal rate of substitution between goods to the relative price. Equation (5) is the Euler equation for consumption. Equation (6) is the …rst-order condition for net foreign assets.
Equation (7) is the labor-supply condition. These equations are standard. Equation (8) is the Euler equation for housing and states that at the margin the bene…ts from consuming housing have to be equal to the costs.
Combining (5) and (6) we obtain a non-arbitrage condition between home and foreign bonds: 19
Since all consumption goods are traded and there are no barriers to trade, we assume in this paper that the law of one price holds: 1 9 The log-linearized version of this equation could be interpreted as the uncovered interest-rate parity.
where variables with a star denote foreign variables and P LIT t is the foreign price of goods produced at home.
Constrained Consumers (Borrowers)
Constrained consumers in LIT are of two types: those who borrow at a variable rate and those who do so at a …xed rate. The di¤erence between them is the interest rate they are charged. The variablerate constrained consumer faces R LIT t , which will coincide with the rate set by the central bank. The …xed-rate borrower pays R LIT t , derived from the …nancial intermediary's problem. The proportion of variable-rate consumers in LIT is constant and exogenous and is equal to LIT 2 [0; 1].
Constrained consumers are more impatient than unconstrained ones, that is e < in terms of discount factors for borrowers and savers respectively. Constrained consumers face a collateral constraint: the expected debt repayment in the next period cannot exceed a proportion of the expectation of tomorrow's value of today's stock of housing:
where equations (11) and (12) represent the collateral constraint for the variable-and …xed-rate borrower, respectively. k LIT t can be interpreted as the loan-to-value ratio in LIT. Notice that such models with collateral constraints, the LTV is typically considered exogenous. At the macroeconomic level, LTVs partly depend on exogenous factors such as regulation. This parameter is usually calibrated to match the average (market) LTV in the country analyzed. 20 However, in this model, it can vary depending on economic conditions, as a macroprudential policy variable. 21 For the setting of the …xed interest rate, R LIT t , we follow Rubio (2011). We assume that there is a …nancial intermediary in each country 2 0 Due to data availability, we use the average new loans'LTV at origination. 2 1 It has to be taking into account that in reality, macroprudential LTV caps are not always binding. Even a stable LTV cap inherently has a countercyclical e¤ect as it is less binding after a crisis but is likely to become more binding as credit and housing prices pick up during the …nancial cycle (Matk · enait· e et al., 2016).
that accepts deposits from savers and extends both …xed and variable-rate mortgages to borrowers. For the two types of mortgage to be o¤ered, the …xed-interest rate has to be such that the intermediary is indi¤erent between lending at a variable or …xed rate. R LIT t will be an aggregate interest rate that contains information on all the past …xed-interest rates associated with past debt. Each period, this aggregate interest rate is updated with a new …xed interest rate that is an average discount average of all future variable interest rates.
Without loss of generality, we present the problem for the variable-rate borrower since for the …xed rate it is symmetrical. Variable-rate borrowers maximize their lifetime utility function:
where C cv t = (C cv LIT t ) n (C cv EU Rt ) 1 n ; subject to the budget constraint (in terms of good LIT):
and subject to the collateral constraint (11) . Notice that variable-rate borrowers repay all debt every period and acquire new debt at the current new interest rate. This assumption implies that the interest rate on variable-rate mortgages is revised every period for the whole stock of debt and changed according to the policy rate. 22 To make the problem for …xed-rate borrowers symmetrical and analogous to existing models with borrowing constraints, we assume the same debt-repayment structure for this type of borrower. Obviously, …xed-rate contracts are not revised every period. However, to make the model more realistic, but still tractable, the …xed-interest rate will be such that a revised …xed rate will be applied only on new debt, keeping constant the interest rate applied to existing debt. In this way, we reconcile the structure of the model with the fact that …xed-rate contracts are long term.
The …rst-order conditions for these consumers are as follows:
These …rst-order conditions di¤er from those of unconstrained individuals. In the case of constrained consumers, the Lagrange multiplier on the borrowing constraint ( cv t ) appears in equations (16) and (18) . As in Iacoviello (2005) , the borrowing constraint is always binding, so that constrained individuals borrow the maximum amount they are allowed, and their saving is zero. The problem for consumers is analogous in country EUR.
Firms 3.2.1 Final-Goods Producers
In LIT, there is a continuum of …nal-goods producers that aggregate intermediate goods according to the production function:
where " > 1 is the elasticity of substitution among intermediate goods.
The total demand of intermediate-good z is given by Y LIT t (z) =
Y LIT t ; and the price index is
Intermediate-Goods Producers
The intermediate-goods market is monopolistically competitive. Following Iacoviello (2005) , intermediate goods are produced according to the following production function:
where t represents technology. We assume that log t = log t 1 + u t , where is the autoregressive coe¢ cient and u t is a normally distributed shock to technology. LIT 2 [0; 1] measures the relative size of each group in terms of labor 23 .
The …rst-order conditions for labor demand are the following: 24
where X t is the markup, or the inverse of marginal cost.
The price-setting problem for the intermediate-goods producers is a standard Calvo-Yun case. An intermediate-goods producer sells goods at price P LIT t (z) ; and 1 is the probability of being able to change the sale price in every period. The optimal reset price P OP T LIT t (z) solves the following:
The aggregate price level is given as follows:
Using (23) and (24) and log-linearizing, we can obtain the standard forward-looking Phillips curve 25 .
The …rm problem is similar in EUR.
Aggregate Variables and Market Clearing
Given LIT ; the fraction of variable-rate borrowers in LIT, we can de…ne aggregates across constrained consumers as the sum of variable-rate and …xed-rate aggregates, so that C c
Therefore, economy-wide aggregates in LIT are
The aggregate supply of housing is …xed, so that market clearing requires H t H u t + H c t = H. 26 2 3 It can be seen as labor-income share and proxy for the di¤erences in debt to GDP. 2 4 Symmetry across …rms allows avoiding index z: 2 5 The Phillips curve is as the following:^ LIT t = ^ LIT t+1 e kxt + uLIT t,wherex is 1/real marginal cost and e k = [(1 )(1 )= ]: 2 6 An endogenous supply of housing could be easily introduced in a two-sector version of this model. However, the qualitative results would not change for the demand side of the model which is the focus of this paper. The market clearing condition for the …nal good in LIT is nY LIT t = nC LIT t + (1 n) C LIT t + 
Monetary Policy 3.4.1 Taylor Rule
The model closes with a Taylor rule, with interest-rate smoothing for interest-rate setting by a single central bank, 27
0 1 is the parameter associated with interest-rate inertia.
(1 + ) measures the sensitivity of interest rates to current in ‡ation. " R;t is a white noise shock process with zero mean and variance 2 " . R is the interest rate in steady state. This rule is consistent with the primary objective of the ECB being price stability.
Extended Taylor Rule
As part of the discussion, we also consider an extended Taylor rule in which the central bank takes care of both macroeconomic and …nancial stability. It is extended in the sense that the interest rate setting also takes into account credit variables. The framework is analogous to the simple Taylor rule in the sense that the response of the interest rate to credit will take into account this variable in all the countries of the union, appropriately weighted by their country size.
LTV Policy
As an approximation for the way macroprudential policy works in the euro area, we consider a rule for the LTV. 28 In standard models, the LTV is a …xed parameter which is not a¤ected by economic conditions.
However, we can think of regulations of LTVs as a way to moderate credit booms. When the LTV (cap)
is high, the collateral constraint is less tight. And, since the constraint here is binding, borrowers will borrow as much as they are allowed to. Lowering the LTV tightens the constraint and therefore restricts the loans that borrowers can obtain. Recent research on macroprudential policies has proposed simple rules for the LTV so that it reacts inversely to variables such that the growth rates of GDP, credit, the credit-to-GDP ratio or house prices. 29 We decided to make the rule more parsimonious allowing the LTV to react to borrowing. This will help for a further study on the interactions with monetary policy.
Here, we assume that there exists a macroprudential Taylor-type rule for the LTV, so that it responds to deviations of credit from its steady state. 30 We consider a decentralized macroprudential policy in which each country can implement its own rule:
where k SSLIT ; b LIT are the steady-state values for the loan-to-value ratio and borrowing in LIT. LIT b ; EU R b 0 measure the response of the loan-to-value to deviations of borrowing from its steady state in Lithuania and the rest of the euro area, respectively. This kind of rule would be countercyclical, delivering a lower LTV in credit booms, therefore restricting the credit in the economy. 2 8 The literature has shown that restricting credit from the demand side (LTV) or the supply side (Capital requirements, CRR) show similar results on the macroeconomy (See for instance Angelini et al., 2014) . Therefore, we expect the conclusions of the paper to hold. We prefer to use the LTV limit because it is not controled by Basel regulations as the CRR and countries have more freedom to set it. 2 9 With a macroprudential orientation, Kannan et al., (2012) also examine a monetary policy rule that reacts to prices, output and changes in collateral values with a macroprudential instrument based on the LTV; Funke and Paetz (2012) consider a non-linear version of a macroprudential rule for the LTV.
3 0 We have also experimented with rules that react to output and house prices and results for the dynamics of the model are similar. The …rst variable would correspond to the objective of the macroprudential regulator to moderate booms in the economy that could lead to an excessive credit growth. Drehmann et al. (2010) also point out that the deviations of credit from its long-term trend are very good indicators of the increase in systemic risk, which is the macroprudential attention. As for the house prices, given collateral constraints, they are the key causal variable for the dynamics of loans to households, and it appears to correspond to the actual behavior of policymakers (Angelini et al., 2012 ).
Welfare Measure
In order to provide a measure for welfare, we numerically evaluate how cross-country asymmetries a¤ect welfare for a given policy rule and for technology shocks. As discussed in Benigno and Woodford (2012), the two approaches that have recently been used for welfare analysis in DSGE models include either characterizing the optimal Ramsey policy, or solving the model using a second-order approximation to the structural equations for given policy and then evaluating welfare using this solution. As in Mendicino and Pescatori (2007), we take this latter approach to be able to evaluate the welfare of the three types of agents separately. 31 The individual welfare for savers and borrowers in LIT is de…ned, respectively, as follows:
Following Mendicino and Pescatori (2007), we de…ne social welfare in LIT as a weighted sum of the individual welfare for the di¤erent types of households:
Borrowers and savers'welfare are weighted by 1 e and (1 ) ; respectively, so that the two groups receive the same level of utility from a constant consumption stream. Everything is symmetrical for EUR.
Total welfare is de…ned as a weighted sum of the welfare in the two countries:
In order to make the results more intuitive, we present welfare changes in terms of consumption equivalents. We use as a benchmark the welfare evaluated when the macroprudential policy is not active and compare it with the welfare obtained when such policy is implemented. 32 
Parameter Values
Parameters are calibrated to re ‡ect the economy of Lithuania and the rest of the euro area. Some of the parameters are standard and are common for both economies and some others will be speci…cally calibrated for each country. Tables 1 and 2 present a summary of the parameter values.
Discount factors are set to be common in both economies, following the standard values in the literature. The discount factor for savers, , is set to 0:99. 33 The discount factor for borrowers, e , is set to 0:98. 34 The steady-state weight of housing in the utility function, j, is set to 0:12 and 0:14, in the euro area and Lithuania, respectively. This parameter pins down the ratio of housing wealth to GDP, since the latter in the steady state is a function of this parameter. 35 We set = 2, implying a value of the labor supply elasticity of 1: 36 For the LTV we consider a steady-state value of 0.68 and 0.78, for the euro area and Lithuania, respectively, taking the LTV observed in the data. 37 The labor-income share of unconstrained consumers, , is set to 0:7. 38 We pick a value of 6 for ", the elasticity of substitution We consider , the proportion of variable-rate mortgages, to be 0.45 and 0.82, in the euro area and Lithuania, respectively. The size of Lithuania is considered to be 0.35%. 40 A technology shock was a 1 per cent positive technology with 0.9 persistence. 41 For simulations, we set LIT
We set this number arbitrarily to a low value to give a sense of how the macroprudential rule works. Tables 1 and 2 present a summary of the parameter values. 42 
Shock Transmission
In this section, we study the dynamics of the model by showing impulse-responses to a monetary policy shock, a technology shock and a house price shock, when there are and there are not macroprudential policies, using the parameter values shown in Table 2 . As in the previous section, we consider two types of macroprudential policies: an extended Taylor rule in which the central bank takes care of …nancial stability vs. a rule for the LTV, in which each authority has separate objectives (TR+LTV Rule).
for the US. Figure 1 presents impulse responses to a monetary policy shock. This represents a decrease in the interest rate by the ECB, in order to re ‡ect an expansionary shock that increases risk in the economy and gives rise to macroprudential policies. As it is an expansionary common shock, borrowing in both Lithuania and the rest of the euro area increase. This is due to lower cost of borrowing. However, the increase in borrowing is stronger in Lithuania, given the nature of its mortgage rate. Variable rates in Lithuania make that the pass-through of the policy rate to the actual borrowing rate is stronger and thus the increase in borrowing is higher than for its partners. Given wealth e¤ects and the increase in borrowing, consumption in both countries also goes up. The hike of credit gives rise to the activation of macroprudential policies. Both the extended Taylor rule and the LTV rule respond countercyclically to credit growth and therefore cut it, each one with its own instrument. Figure 2 shows how, for the case in which the LTV rule is active, the LTV decreases both in Lithuania and in the rest of the euro area.
Impulse responses to a monetary policy shock
We see that for this shock, the LTV rule is the most e¤ective one in order to reduce credit. A decrease of the LTV would partially o¤set the e¤ects of the expansionary monetary policy shock. As a result, the impact of the shock on consumption would be mitigated, in a stronger way for the case of the LTV rule. Figure 3 presents impulse responses to a technology shock in both countries. This is also by nature an expansionary shock and makes credit increase. Furthermore, as a reaction, the ECB policy rate goes down and this boosts credit even more. As in the previous case, variable rates in Lithuania make borrowing increase by more in this country than in the rest of the euro area. Thus, this shock also calls for macroprudential policies to be in place and soften the credit expansion ( Figure 4 displays the decrease in the LTV in both countries). When macroprudential policies are activated, borrowing does not increase as much as in the benchmark case. We also see that, given that both macroprudential rules are countercyclical, the real economy gets also a¤ected and the increase in consumption in both countries is also mitigated. However, we see that for the case of this shock, the extended Taylor rule reduces credit in a more substantial way than the LTV rule. Figure 5 describes impulse responses to a house price shock both in Lithuania and in the rest of the euro area. 43 We see from the …gure that the house price shock has stronger e¤ects in Lithuania and this causes credit to increase by more in this country. This creates strong e¤ects on mortgaged houses and on consumption. In the rest of the euro area, the e¤ects are similar but weaker, are more concentrated in the housing market, producing a slight decrease in consumption. Macroprudential policies act countercyclically and soften the increase in credit in both countries (See …gure 6). In this case, the extended Taylor rule reduces credit by more in the rest on the euro area while the LTV rule is more e¤ective in Lithuania. 
Impulse Responses to a Technology Shock

Impulse Responses to a House Price Shock
Financial and Macroeconomic Stability
In this section, we study the implications of each setting (Taylor rule, extended Taylor rule and Taylor and LTV rule) for …nancial and macroeconomic stability. We approximate …nancial stability by the standard deviation of credit. Macroeconomic stability corresponds to the standard deviation of in ‡ation and output. Here we try to assess the implication of having monetary policy with the interest rate in charge of …nancial stability as opposed to a di¤erent instrument, namely the LTV, taking care of this goal and leaving monetary policy with the single objective of price stability. Svensson (2012) argues that conducting monetary policy and …nancial-stability policy in an integrated way may be inappropriate, since monetary policy and …nancial-stability policy are distinct and separate policies with di¤erent objectives and di¤erent instruments. Tinbergen (1952) put forth what we now call the 'Tinbergen principle,' that policymakers need at least one independent policy instrument for each policy objective. Since the policy interest rate is used by monetary policymakers to achieve the objective of price stability, at least one other instrument is required to achieve the additional objective of …nancial stability of macroprudential policy. Svensson (2012) suggests that monetary policy should be in charge of price stability while macroprudential policy needs to address …nancial stability. We try to shed some light to the debate with our results. 44 Table 3 presents the macroeconomic and …nancial volatilities for each macroprudential policy setting. 45 We can interpret the …rst row of the table as a benchmark in which monetary policy responds to in ‡ation and there are no macroprudential policies in place. This would be the pre-crisis policy setting.
The second row illustrates equation (26), in which the Taylor rule is extended to include credit variables and take care of …nancial stability in addition to price stability. Finally, the third row could correspond to a situation in which the central bank's objective is the union price stability while there are national macroprudential authorities that maintain …nancial stability.
We see that, initially, without macroprudential policies, the …nancial scenario in Lithuania is more unstable than in the rest of the euro area. Variable-rate mortgages, high LTVs and di¤erent housing characteristics make borrowing more volatile in this country. When macroprudential policies are introduced, we see that the volatility of credit decreases in all cases. Including credit variables in the Taylor rule is also very e¤ective for …nancial stability purposes. However, it clearly comes at the cost of increasing macroeconomic instability, especially coming from in ‡ation. Having the central bank taking care of both objectives at the same time creates con ‡icts in reaching both at the same time. When there is a separate macroprudential authority taking care of …nancial stability, the central bank can do its job and macroeconomic stability is not in danger. With respect to the benchmark case, the volatility of borrowing is reduced, although not as much as with an extended Taylor rule.
As a complement to Table 3, Table 4 presents welfare results: Consistently with Table 3 , we can observe that having the two authorities taking care of di¤erent objectives is more bene…cial for the whole economy, since welfare gains are larger in this case, in line with Carrillo et al. (2016) . We also observe that borrowers prefer the extended Taylor rule because it is more e¤ective in terms of achieving …nancial stability. However, this comes at the expense of higher welfare losses for savers because macroeconomic stability is compromised.
In order to convey our results and as a robustness check, we present the volatilities implied by both macroprudential policies for di¤erent values of the credit reaction parameter b in both the extended Taylor rule and the LTV rule. Figure 7 presents the volatility of credit implied by increasing the aggressiveness of macroprudential policies. We take the volatility of credit as an indicator of …nancial stability, in the sense that if it gets lower, it means that the …nancial system is more stable. We check how the volatility of credit changes when we increase the credit reaction parameter for both the extended Taylor rule and the LTV rule. We …nd that in Lithuania, the starting point with respect to the volatility of credit is higher than in the rest of the euro area, because of the above mentioned special characteristics of this economy with respect to its European partners, that make the …nancial system of this country more sensitive to shocks. The …gure shows that both rules are e¤ective in terms of reducing the volatility of borrowing and therefore in bringing a more stable …nancial system, the goal of macroprudential policies. However, the macroprudential Taylor rule seems to be more e¤ective for this purpose in both countries, at least for the range of parameters that we are considering. Nevertheless, …gure 7 only considers the …nancial stability, the objective of macroprudential policy, and does not consider macroeconomic stability. and credit for the extended Taylor rule for monetary policy. We can actually see that even though this rule is very e¤ective in reducing the volatility of credit, it comes with a cost in terms of in ‡ation. The volatility of output slightly improves with the aggressiveness of the rule with respect to credit, but the in ‡ation one worsens. Therefore, when using the interest rate as the only instrument both for monetary and macroprudential policy, there is a trade-o¤ between stabilizing the …nancial system and keeping prices stable, which should be the primary goal of monetary policy. Monetary and macroprudential policy objectives enter in con ‡ict if there is just one instrument for two goals.
On the contrary, …gure 9 displays the volatilities implied by increasing the aggressiveness of the LTV rule. We can see that in this case, although not as e¤ective as the previous case, this rule manages to achieve the goal of increasing …nancial stability without compromising the objectives of monetary policy.
This reinforces the "Tinbergen principle" which argues that there should be two di¤erent instruments when there are two di¤erent policy goals. 46 
Concluding Remarks
In this paper we develop a two-country DSGE model with housing to study the implications of macroprudential policies in both Lithuania and the rest of the euro area, given the recent entrance of Lithuania 4 6 This result is in line with Quint and Rabanal (2014), which studied core and periphery countries in the euro area. in the euro area. One of the countries is calibrated to re ‡ect the Lithuanian economy, while the other one represents the rest of the euro area. We consider two di¤erent ways of implementing macroprudential policies. In the …rst one, the ECB extends its goals to also include …nancial stability. In this case, with just one instrument, namely the interest rate, the central bank takes care of two objectives: price and …nancial stability. In the second policy scenario, the central bank focuses on price stability having the interest rate as an instrument while a separate macroprudential authority uses an LTV rule to pursue …nancial stability. First, we illustrate the dynamics of the model for both rules by showing impulse responses to a monetary policy shock, a technology shock and a house price shock. Results show that in Lithuania, shocks are transmitted in a stronger way given variable rates in this country, higher mortgage debt and LTVs. However, macroprudential policies are indeed successful at mitigating the e¤ects on shocks on credit growth. Then, we study the implications of both policy scenarios for macroeconomic and …nancial stability. We …nd that both rules are e¤ective in terms of reducing the volatility of borrowing and therefore in bringing a more stable …nancial system, the goal of macroprudential policies.
However, the macroprudential Taylor rule seems to be more e¤ective for this purpose in both countries.
Nevertheless, even though this rule is very e¤ective in reducing the volatility of credit, it comes with a cost in terms of in ‡ation volatility. When using the interest rate as the only instrument both for monetary and macroprudential policy, there is a trade-o¤ between stabilizing the …nancial system and keeping prices stable, which should be the primary goal of monetary policy. The LTV rule, although not as e¤ective as the extended Taylor rule, manages to achieve the goal of increasing …nancial stability without compromising the objectives of monetary policy, which it is still the goal of a standard Taylor Rule. Welfare results are consistent with these …ndings. Greece and Hungary. For the rates, the data concern new loans and are from ECB SDW (data up to 2016). For the rates, V means that the majority of loans are at variable rates while F stands for …xed.
The data on household (HH) or NFCs debt/GDP are from Eurostat and they are for 2015. The Max LTV is the regulatory LTV if the value is in bold. These are averaged if concern di¤erent types of loans. 47 
